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      After the Global Financial Crisis, the usage of capital controls and macroprudential policies have returned 
and become an essential element of the policy paradigm in different countries. However, our knowledge on 
the effectiveness of these policy instruments is still insufficient and requires serious empirical reconsideration.  
    With the advancement in trade, financial flows, and network linkages, integration of the capital markets has 
become a modern reality and so have the risks emanating from the same. The literature is in broad agreement 
that capital flows can have considerable benefits for countries, including improving efficiency, 
competitiveness of the financial sector, investments and consumption smoothing (Levy-Yeyati and Zuñiga 
2015). However, capital flows may also pose macroeconomic challenges and carry significant risks, which 
can be enlarged by gaps in countries' financial and institutional policies. In particular, a large volume of capital 
flows (fear of large inflows), coupled with its volatile and procyclical nature, can trigger a variety of financial 
and real risks: excessive currency appreciation,1 dollar liquidity crises, asset price bubbles, and over-
indebtedness (Calvo et al. 1994; Ostry et al. 2010; Magud et al. 2011; Levy-Yeyati and Zuñiga 2015). This 
calls for a pressing need for usage of regulatory policy toolbox containing capital controls and macroprudential 
instruments to address the systemic nature of these risk factors. 
    The paper employs quantitative research methods to explore one of the fundamental research questions on 
capital flow regulations offered by Magud and Reinhart (2007, 2011). Our paper will be the first in the 
literature to empirically examine whether capital flow regulations can reduce the volume of cross-border 
banking flows. Most of the previous studies examine the impact of capital controls or macroprudential policies 
on credit or asset price growth with differentiation on different sectors of the economy such as real estate 
credit, non-financial corporations and others (Binici et al. 2010, Lim et al. 2011, Cerutti et al. 2015, Bruno et 
al. 2015). Although Ghosh et al. (2014) offer similar results and examine whether cross-border banking flows 
can be regulated by imposing capital controls in both source and borrowing countries. We extend these studies 
by exploring the effectiveness of macroprudential instruments in reducing the volume of cross-border banking 
flows. We also provide new cross-country evidence on the use and effectiveness of capital controls imposed 
on different asset classes which other research has somewhat neglected. Segmentation on asset classes is 
important because, beyond their macroeconomic impacts, cross-border capital flows and particularly certain 
types of liabilities can bring financial fragility to the economy (Ostry et al. 2010, Eichengreen and Rose 2014). 
     The main contribution of our paper is in identifying that capital controls (on both outflows and inflows) 
and macroprudential instruments are effective measures in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows, 
and thus systemic risks in a sample of 112 countries over 2000—2016. Although there are few exceptions, 
namely equity and financial credits inflow restrictions appear to be insignificant regulatory measures. Using 
panel regressions incorporating country fixed effects, we find that direct investment and equity outflow 
                                               
1 Fear of appreciation is defined as the tendency to intervene to depreciate (or to delay the appreciation of) the local currency (Levy-
Yeyati and Zuñiga 2015). 
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restrictions have the highest significance than other types of asset classes, such as the bond, financial credits, 
money market, derivatives and collective investments outflow restrictions. These results are consistent with 
pecking order theory on capital flows and are connected with the riskiness of different asset classes.  
     We provide empirical evidence that FX and/or countercyclical reserve (RR_REV) and general 
countercyclical capital buffer requirements (CTC), reserve requirement ratios (RR) and concentration limits 
(CONC) are the most effective macroprudential policies in reducing potentially destabilising cross-border 
banking flows. This empirical evidence reflects recent developments in Basel III regulations and highlights 
their effectiveness in raising the resilience of the banking sector in an international dimension. Essentially, 
Basel III regulations have shown the importance of setting aside bank reserves which may offset adverse 
effects of systemic risks. Basel III regulations are also aimed at enhancing Tier 1 capital requirements through 
the greater use of capital buffers. Two types of capital buffers can be introduced across different countries, 
namely a capital conservation buffer (2.5% of RWA) and a countercyclical capital buffer (from 0% to 2.5% 
of RWA). The main feature of a countercyclical capital buffer is that it is employed when there is a surplus 
credit growth in the economies to reduce this credit growth. While capital conservation buffer is designed to 
be large enough to enable financial institutions to maintain the level of capital above the minimum threshold 
during periods of downturn. The countercyclical capital buffer is already launched and have its effect on global 
liquidity conditions while the capital conservation buffer is launched only recently in 2019. 
     Additionally, capital surcharges on SIFIs (SIFI), limits on interbank exposures (INTER) and foreign 
currency loans (FC) are also associated with a large reduction in flows, a finding which contributes to the 
literature by emphasising the importance of macroprudential instruments aimed at financial institutions’ assets 
or liabilities. However, leverage ratios (LEV), limits on domestic currency loans (CG), levy/tax on financial 
institutions (TAX), and other borrower related instruments are not associated with dampening cross-border 
banking flows. For instance, in 2016 leverage ratios were set at 3% of Tier 1 capital and were implemented by 
countries on a test basis with perspective to fully launch the use of leverage ratios in 2018 and 2019. This 
suggests that implementation of leverage ratios across-countries is at an early stage and this affects the ability 
of these instruments to reduce the volume of cross-border banking flows.  
       At times of large and volatile cross-border capital flows it is desirable to employ both capital controls and 
macroprudential regulations, with latter tend to be generally more effective measures in curbing the volume 
of cross-border banking flows. We corroborate previous empirical evidence that the effectiveness of capital 
controls and macroprudential policies vary markedly across different countries and international policy 
coordination is needed.  
       We are using a series of robustness checks and different control variables to confirm the validity of my 
results estimated in the panel regressions with country fixed effects. Panel regressions are complemented by 
using the method of maximum likelihood (MLE) and the generalised method of moments (GMM) to ensure 
that the potential issue of endogeneity does not undermine the main inferences.  
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2. Literature review     
     The last global financial crisis highlighted the fragility of the global financial system and the need for new 
approaches to its regulation. We argue that previous literature does not provide persuasive evidence on the 
effectiveness of capital controls and macroprudential policies in reducing the volume of cross-border capital 
flows.  
 
2.1 The use and effectiveness of capital controls  
 
    Initially, Harry Dexter White (on the U.S. side) and John Maynard Keynes (on the side of the UK) both 
agreed that restrictions on capital flows should be a fundamental part of an international monetary system 
(Bretton Woods Agreement, 1944).  
    The articles of Binici et al. (2010), Baba and Kokenyne (2011) and Ahmed and Zlate (2013) provide only 
mixed evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls across borders. Binici et al. (2010) show that capital 
account restrictions on equities and bonds are effective in curbing capital outflows but appear to have been 
ineffective in curbing inflows. Baba and Kokenyne (2011) make an empirical analysis of case studies and 
argue that capital controls imposed in certain economies can reduce capital inflows, but this influence tends 
to be short-lived (e.g. Binici et al. (2010) provide cross-country evidence). While Ahmed and Zlate (2013) 
show that capital controls are significant regulatory measures in curbing total portfolio inflows. Later on, 
Cerutti et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence that capital account restrictions on both outflows and inflows 
can be effective in reducing the level and cyclicality of cross-border banking flows. 
     As a one step further, Ostry et al. (2010) offer a pecking order theory of capital flows which is connected 
with the riskiness of different asset classes. The authors offer a decreasing order of riskiness of different asset 
classes, with measures intended for the short-term period are riskier than long-term measures. For instance, 
debt in foreign currency and debt in local currency are the riskiest asset classes while equity investments and 
foreign direct investments (FDIs) are less risky. Levy-Yeyati and Zúñiga (2015) also argue that some flows 
are much riskier than others, namely FDI are expected to be less volatile and more stable than portfolio flows 
and especially debt flows versus equity. This suggests that it is much easier to regulate and impose capital 
account restrictions on those asset classes which are less risky.  
      In this context, Levy-Yeyati (2011) argue that capital controls should be referred to macroprudential 
instruments and be used in conjunction with them to avoid inflation in asset prices and overestimation, that is 
pricey to turn back in the down cycle (Ostry et al. 2010, 2012, Korinek and Sandri 2015). For example, Korinek 
and Sandri (2015) explore what is better to apply for regulation of capital flows the macroprudential 
instruments or capital controls. They conclude that it is better to use both instruments because macroprudential 
instruments may lower excessive borrowing, whereas capital controls may create a flourishing economy with 
the decent level of savings (Gallagher et al. 2012; Ghosh et al. 2014; Korinek and Sandri 2015, 2016). While 
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Ostry et al. (2010, 2012) argue that capital controls can complement and should be used alongside, instead of 
replacing corresponding monetary and macroprudential policies. 
    Nowadays, the IMF stands for a free movement of goods and services through the current account, but 
countries should be wide open to imposing capital controls. This corresponds to one of the main pillars of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement (1944) on capital flow regulations in an international dimension.  
 
2.2 The use and effectiveness of macroprudential policies 
 
    The main effects and motivations for usage of macroprudential policies are still not very clear and require 
further empirical investigation (Claessens 2014). Korinek (2014) claims that we need to employ 
macroprudential instruments to manage capital mobility across countries for avoidance of future financial 
crises (IMF 2012, Gallagher and Tian 2014; Ostry et al. 2010).  
    The early literature on the use and effectiveness of macroprudential policies comprises the studies by such 
researchers as Borio and Shim (2007), Lim et al. (2011), Habermeier et al. (2011), Qureshi et al. (2012) and 
Claessens et al. (2014). They argue that macroprudential policies are effective in lowering system-wide risks, 
however, they might have only a marginal effect on capital flows.  
     While it is widely acknowledged that large and volatile capital flows can increase the possibility of credit 
booms and the occurrence of systemic risks in different countries. Claessens (2014) argue that it is still not 
very clear what macroprudential instruments can influence the volume of cross-border banking flows and as 
such reduce systemic risks. However, some recent studies suggest that macroprudential instruments might be 
effective in reducing cross-border capital flows. For instance, Bruno et al. (2015) provide empirical evidence 
that macroprudential policies are effective regulatory measures in mitigating bank and bond inflows to the 
Asia-Pacific countries (Bruno and Shin 2014). In turn, Beirne and Friedrich (2014, 2017) provide evidence 
that the effectiveness of macroprudential regulations in reducing capital flows also relies on the composition 
of the domestic banking system, such as the regulatory quality or banks' efficiency (Abiad et al. 2009, 
Papaioannou 2009). These empirical findings largely confirm the theoretical literature on macroprudential 
policies and their welfare-enhancing character (Lorenzoni 2008, Korinek 2010, Federico 2011, Korinek and 
Sandri 2015).  
 
3. Research questions and hypotheses development 
 
    Using a sample of 112 countries around the world, the paper investigates the impact of capital controls and 
macroprudential instruments on the volume of cross-border banking flows. This research is motivated by the 
existence of financial globalisation which synchronises and brings volatility to capital flows across different 
countries (Reinhart et al. 1993, Ang and Bekaert 2002, Forbes and Warnock 2012). As a result, many countries 
around the world have encountered difficulties in dealing with large and volatile capital inflows, including 
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banking flows and short-term debt. Our results support the evidence uncovered in previous studies by Galati 
and Moessner (2011, 2014), Cerutti et al. (2014, 2015), Bruno et al. (2015) and contribute to the existing 
literature by investigating two main research questions: 
 
1)    Are capital controls imposed on different asset classes effective in reducing the volume of cross-border 
banking flows? 
2)    Are macroprudential regulations effective in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows? 
 
    Our research questions allow to formulate the following empirical hypothesis to test in the panel regressions 
with country fixed effects:    
 
    Empirical Hypothesis 1. Imposing capital controls on different asset classes reduces the volume of cross-
border banking flows. 
 Empirical Hypothesis 2.  Cross-border banking flows decrease in the level of macroprudential 
regulations. 
    These research questions are of great importance because they allow to work out the most effective 
regulatory mechanism aimed at preventing systemic/system-wide financial crises. Clearly, an approach to 
measuring the effectiveness of capital controls and macroprudential instruments is required, as it would 
coordinate and direct the further development of these instruments (Turner 2010, Galati et al. 2011, Constâncio 
2014). Policymakers and economists should bear in mind that imposing capital flow regulations can be costly 
and carry adverse effects on other countries. This justifies research on capital flow regulations, because if they 
are not effective then it is not worth to adopt them? 
 
4.  Data and research methodology 
 
   We apply quantitative research methodology to explore the effectiveness of capital controls and 
macroprudential instruments in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows (Cerutti et al. 2014, 2015, 
Claessens 2014, Freixas et al. 2015). It involves the analysis of large panel data sets (also known as 
longitudinal or cross-sectional time-series data), and employs panel regression analysis with country fixed 
effects and clustered standard errors at the country level as the main research method. The BIS Locational 
statistics allows to explore the contemporaneous impact of both macroprudential policies and capital controls 






4.1 Data and summary statistics    
     The sample covers 112 countries for which statistical data is available on an annual frequency starting from 
2000 to 2016. Tables 1 and 2 (APPENDIX) offer descriptive statistics of variables and the list of countries 
included in the regression analyses, respectively. 
     The empirical analysis is based on the data on cross-border positions reported by banking offices from BIS 
Locational statistics (Table A6). The Bank of International Settlements’ Locational banking statistics (BIS 
LBS) reflects the obligations (credits, securities, and other claims) of local debtors to overseas banks across 
different countries. These data are residence-based, namely, domestically-incorporated banks in the reporting 
economy register their positions on an unconsolidated basis, comprising positions vis-à-vis their own affiliates 
in other economies (Cerutti et al. 2015). This conforms to the conventional balance-of-payments accounting 
standards. The BIS Locational banking statistics also has such remarkable feature as the exchange rate-
adjusted series. These exchange rate-adjusted series better reflect changes in cross-border positions reported 
by banking offices.  
    Capital control measures are taken from Martin Schindler database and IMF's Annual Report on Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Restrictions (AREAER). This data is also compared with Capital Control Indices from 
Fernández et al. (2015) database.2 While Macroprudential Indices are based on Cerutti et al. (2015) database 
and supplemented by the new evidence from the IMF’s AREAER database and European Central Bank 
Warehouse.34 In our empirical analysis, we divide our macroprudential instruments into two main categories 
financial institution-targeted instruments and borrower-targeted instruments. Table 3 (APPENDIX) shows a 
detailed description of both financial institution-targeted and borrower-targeted macroprudential instruments. 
Financial institution-targeted instruments represent a sum of ten macroprudential instruments, while borrower-
targeted instruments are a sum of two macroprudential instruments.  
     The main data sources are the World Economic Outlook (WEO), Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Economic 
Data (FRED), Federal Reserve Board (Fed) website and Datastream. A thorough process of data cleaning has 
been undertaken with variables winsorized at the 2.5% percentile to limit the effect of outliers.  
 
4.2 Empirical model specification  
     To analyze the effect of capital controls and macroprudential policies on global liquidity in a sample of 112 
countries, the following panel regression with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the country 
level is offered: 
                                               
2 Fernández et al. (2015) "Capital Control Measures: A New Dataset". Available at: http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w20970/ 
3 Cerutti et al. (2015) “The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence”. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Use-and-Effectiveness-of-Macroprudential-Policies-New-
Evidence-42791 
4 European Central Bank Warehouse macroprudential database. Available at: https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9689335 
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∆𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑗,𝑡=𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐿𝑛𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∆𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝐿𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽5 ∆ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽6 ∆ 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝑛𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑗,𝑡  +
𝛽8 ∆ 𝑀2(𝑈𝑆)𝑡  + 𝛽8∆𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽9CapControlIndex/MPPs𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
Dependent variable:  
   BankClaims – per cent change in cross-border claims on banks (exchange rate adjusted), BIS Locational 
Statistics, Table A6. Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore.  
Explanatory variables: 
    𝛽 – estimated coefficient; Stockratio – stock markets turnover ratio (value traded/capitalization); VIX – the 
CBOE Volatility Index; Inflation – annual percentage change of the CPI, end of period; GDP deflator – the 
gross domestic product, deflator (index) is derived by dividing current price GDP by constant price GDP;5 
General government net debt – net debt is calculated as gross debt minus financial assets corresponding to 
debt instruments. These financial assets are: monetary gold and SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, 
loans, insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts receivable; General 
government total expenditure – total expenditure consists of total expense and the net acquisition of 
nonfinancial assets; General government revenue – revenue consists of taxes, social contributions, grants 
receivable, and other revenue. Revenue increases government’s net worth, which is the difference between its 
assets and liabilities; Current account – represents current account balance in per cent of GDP and include all 
transactions other than those in financial and capital items; M2(US) – per cent change in the US Money Supply 
M2; CapControlIndex/MPPs is either – Overall capital account restrictions index, Outflow restrictions index 
and Inflow restrictions index, and/or Macroprudential index;  𝛾𝑗  – are country fixed effects and 𝜀𝑗𝑡 – error 
term. 
       The choice of variables in the model is suggested by previous theoretical and empirical research on the 
use and effectiveness of capital controls and macroprudential policies (Bruno et al. 2015; Cerutti et al. 2014, 
2015). In our empirical model, depending on the data properties we either calculate percentage change or take 
a logarithmic transformation of variables.6 A logarithmic transformation of variables (Ln) this is the way of 
normalising our data as this can help to interpret our numbers and especially it is easier to intuitively 
understand the per cent change or elasticity as opposed to having some variables in level and log. While the 
use of lagged variables in “pull” factors and country fixed effects should mitigate the potential issues of 
endogeneity. In addition, the Levin–Lin–Chu (2002) unit root test (xtunitroot) or stationarity test in panel 
                                               
5  The basket of goods reflected by the GDP deflator, which is a unit of GDP, is different from the typical basket of goods consumed 
by households (which is predominated by the C element of GDP). The GDP deflator should be employed to deflate nominal GDP 
to get real GDP. It is not a measure of household inflation, nor is it assigned to be, and employing to measure the rate of inflation 
rate experienced by households is not right. 
6 see Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach by Wooldridge for discussion and derivation. 
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datasets confirms that there is no unit root in our data series as they have been calculated or taken a logarithmic 
transformation.  
      A panel regression analysis is complemented by using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimation to ensure that the potential issue of endogeneity does not undermine our main inferences. We 
employ a one-step robust system GMM estimation, a method offered by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Robust option points out that the robust estimator of the covariance matrix of the 
parameters will be estimated (Arellano and Bover 1995). This robust estimator makes standard errors of the 
parameter estimates consistent if heteroscedasticity and panel-specific autocorrelation are present in one-step 
estimation.  
 
5. Empirical results 
 
      Many developing and emerging countries encounter a wide range of policy challenges when they employ 
traditional macroeconomic instruments to deal with large and volatile capital flows. For instance, the 
appreciation of the exchange rate lowers the competitiveness of countries, while reducing interest rates might 
be inflationary and lead to overheating. A tighter fiscal policy can have an adverse impact on economic growth 
and its implementation can encounter political hurdles. Additionally, an accumulation of international reserves 
and buffers can be costly and not all countries can afford this (Rodrik 2006, Cruz and Walters 2008).  
      To address these policy challenges capital controls have been widely used as a policy instrument across 
different countries. One disadvantage of these measures is that they distinguish between residents and 
nonresidents and may create a distortion of incentives. As a result, nations started to embrace macroprudential 
policies as they can be applied to the banking or financial system as a whole and do not discriminate between 
residents and nonresidents.  
      Our main contribution is in identifying that macroprudential instruments are effective measures in reducing 
the volume of cross-border banking flows in a sample of 112 countries over 2000—2016. The estimation 
results reported in Table 5 show that the Macroprudential Index (MPI) has the expected negative sign on cross-
border banking flows and is statistically significant at 1%. This index represents a sum of twelve individual 
indices and highlights the importance of macroprudential regulations. Although not all macroprudential 
instruments are effective measures if the objective is to reduce the volume of cross-border banking flows.  
      We divide our macroprudential instruments into two main types financial institution-targeted instruments 
and borrower-targeted instruments. We contribute to the literature by emphasising the importance of 
macroprudential policies aimed at financial institutions’ assets or liabilities. The financial institution-targeted 
instruments index represents a sum of ten individual macroprudential instruments. The empirical results from 
Table 5 show that financial institution-targeted instruments index has the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at 1%. Moving from the median to the 75th percentile of financial institution-targeted 
instruments index decreases bank flows by, on average, about 7% to 11%, respectively. However, we can not 
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directly compare the economic significance of this index as its construction is quite different from the 
construction of other macroprudential indices in our sample.  
       In contrast, borrower-targeted instruments index is insignificant regulatory measure and can not be used 
to reduce the volume of cross-border banking flows. This index represents a sum of two individual 
macroprudential instruments, namely the Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps (LTV_CAP) and Debt-to-Income Ratio 
(DTI). Claessens (2014) argue that financial institution-targeted instruments are more important than 
borrower-targeted instruments when most funding flows go from a more regulated financial system. These 
empirical results are consistent with Basel III regulations (start 2010-2013; end 2019) imposed on the banking 
sector in an international dimension. Overall, financial institution-targeted instruments should prevail over 
borrower-targeted instruments if nations have the objective to reduce the volume of cross-border capital flows. 
This means that policy prioritisation would help to avoid too much discretion, and too little transparency and 
accountability in the financial systems of different countries.  
     We contribute to the literature by showing that FX and/or countercyclical reserve and general 
countercyclical capital buffer requirements, reserve requirement ratios and concentration limits are the most 
effective macroprudential policies in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows. Importantly, FX 
and/or countercyclical reserve (RR_REV) and general countercyclical capital buffer requirements (CTC) 
measures are strongly related with lower cross-border banking flows: these indices have the expected negative 
sign on flows and are statistically significant at 1%. Table 6 shows that moving from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile on RR_REV and CTC Indices can reduce cross-border banking flows by about 12% to 36.5%, 
respectively. These macroprudential instruments show moderate usage across different countries with 
RR_REV having about 26% and CTC having 14% in a sample of 112 countries (Table 4). The statistical data 
shows that FX and/or countercyclical reserve and countercyclical capital buffer requirements are usually 
employed more in emerging and developing countries.  
     In terms of reserve requirement ratios, then these macroprudential regulations are also associated with a 
large decline in capital flows. The estimated elasticity for reserve requirement ratios implies that a 10% higher 
RR Index will decrease cross-border banking flows by 3.3%. Moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile on 
the RR Index reduces cross-border banking flows by about 8.2% to 25%, respectively. 
    This is followed by the significance of concentration limits (CONC) measures in reducing potentially 
disruptive cross-border banking flows. For example, moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile on the CONC 
Index is associated with a reduction in flows by about 8.14% to 24.43%, respectively (Table 6). Notably, 
concentration limits are the most widespread macroprudential instruments in the world with about 80% of 
countries using them over 2000—2016 (Table 4). This suggests the importance of reducing the level of 
concentration in the banking industry to prevent and mitigate future crises. 
     Among other macroprudential policies that impact on the volume of the cross-border bank, flows are capital 
surcharges on SIFIs, limits on interbank exposures (INTER) and limits on foreign currency loans (FC). Table 
7 shows that moving from the median to the 75th percentile of INTER and FC Indices can reduce bank flows 
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by about 12% to 18%, respectively. These macroprudential instruments have the expected negative sign on 
cross-border banking flows and are statistically significant at 5%. This indicates a second policy priority in 
the implementation of these macroprudential regulations at times of large and volatile capital flows. In terms 
of use, then both limits on interbank exposures and limits on foreign currency loans have moderate use across 
countries with about 32% and 20%, respectively (Table 4). Interestingly, limits on interbank exposures are 
usually more used in the advanced and emerging countries while limits on foreign currency loans are more 
used in developing and emerging countries. 
    Nowadays, significant progress is being made to eliminate the systemic risks posed by systemically 
important financial institutions SIFIs by using macroprudential instruments. Table 7 shows that moving from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile on SIFIs Index is associated with a reduction in flows by about 5.4% to 16.3%, 
respectively. Capital surcharges on SIFIs have become popular measures only recently and previously did not 
have any impact on total capital flows as they have been employed only in a limited number of countries, 
primarily developing and emerging economies. Overall, about 11% of countries now are in use of capital 
surcharges on SIFIs and by far this is the smallest percentile compared to the other instruments (Table 4). We 
would expect that the effectiveness of capital surcharges on SIFIs would raise even further by the deadline of 
Basel III regulations in 2019. 
    We also provide empirical evidence that leverage ratios, limits on lending in domestic currency and levy/tax 
on financial institutions appear to be insignificant regulatory measures (Table 8). Cerutti et al. (2015) argue 
that the implementation and effectiveness of different macroprudential instruments go together and they are 
connected with each other. The inability of some macroprudential instruments to reduce the volume of cross-
border banking flows can be also connected with their low use across countries. For instance, leverage ratios 
(LEV) and levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX) make up from about 17% to 15%, respectively (Table 4). 
These measures are used in both advanced and emerging countries, however, the fraction of these 
macroprudential instruments is still relatively low. This adversely affects the effectiveness of these regulatory 
measures in reducing countries’ exposures to variations in global liquidity.  
     The small percentile of leverage ratios (LEV) and levy/tax on financial institutions (TAX) in Table 4 is 
consistent and reflects different stages of Basel III regulations. One of the important features of Basel III 
regulations is imposing mandatory leverage ratios (capital to assets) to lower leverage in the financial 
institutions. The leverage ratios have become a mandatory part of Basel III requirements only in 2018. 
Similarly, limits on lending in domestic currency (CG) are used in about 14% of countries with primarily 
emerging and developing countries in a sample.  
     As the final part of the research, we are aimed to contribute by examining the joint impact of capital controls 
and macroprudential instruments on cross-border banking flows. Tables 10 and 11 show the impact of both 
equity outflow restrictions index and countercyclical capital buffer requirements (CTC) in reducing the 
volume of cross-border banking flows. These indices have the expected negative sign and are statistically and 
economically significant regulatory measures across different countries. This suggests that capital controls can 
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complement and should be used alongside instead of replacing corresponding macroprudential policies. 
Similarly, bond inflow restrictions index, collective investments outflow restrictions index and countercyclical 
capital buffer requirements can reinforce each other and reduce large and volatile cross-border banking flows 
even further. We also look at the joint impact of equity and collective investments outflow restrictions index, 
bond inflow restrictions index and concentration limits (CONC) on cross-border banking flows. Our empirical 
results show that these capital controls and macroprudential instruments can be used together, and in a majority 
of cases, reinforce each other. 
     Table 9 serves as a robustness check for that the Macroprudential Index (MPI) when we include additional 
control variables. Additionally, the system dynamic panel GMM estimation and maximum likelihood (MLE) 
estimation from Table 5 (columns 2 and 4) and Table 7 (columns 2, 4 and 6) largely confirm the economic 
and statistical significance of macroprudential instruments and capital controls included in the panel data 
analysis with country fixed effects, although there might be some small differences. In particular, the system 
dynamic panel GMM highlights the short-lived effect of macroprudential instruments and capital controls and 
suggests that they should be maintained and tuned all the time. 
 
6. Conclusion and policy suggestions 
 
      This paper analyses the usage of capital controls and macroprudential policies aimed at mitigating system-
wide/systemic financial crises across different countries around the world. In general, cross-country analysis 
can be helpful in clarifying that capital controls and macroprudential instruments are effective measures in 
reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows.  
       The large and volatile cross-border banking flows account for a substantial fraction of total capital flows 
and are inclined to have a procyclical nature which threatens financial stability in different countries (Milesi-
Feretti and Tille 2011, Brunnermeier et al. 2012, Bruno and Shin 2013, 2015). Capital flow regulations coupled 
with global monetary policy coordination can lower financial stability risks sufficiently to allow nations to 
reap the benefits of capital flows (Brunnermeier et al. 2012). However, in practice, political decisions may 
impede implementation of multilateral regulations of the banking sector, while monetary policy is inclined to 
be more domestically oriented rather than carry global perspectives in mind. 
     Our main contribution is in identifying that capital controls and macroprudential policies are effective 
measures in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows. Importantly, countries should embrace 
macroprudential policies as a matter of first priority given that they can help to optimally manage capital flows 
without discriminating foreigners. This is consistent with Basel III regulations and highlights their 
effectiveness in raising the resilience of the banking sector in an international dimension. The empirical results 
shed light on the fact that financial institution-targeted prevail over borrower-targeted macroprudential 
instruments in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows. For instance, FX and/or countercyclical 
reserve requirements (RR_REV), reserve requirements ratios (RR) and limits on foreign currency loans (FC) 
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are useful regulatory measures in reducing system-wide vulnerabilities. We find that financial institution-
targeted instruments are employed more often in emerging and developing countries, with especially foreign 
exchange related instruments (RR_REV and FC) have been more widespread. While borrower-targeted 
instruments (LTV_CAP and DTI) are used more in developed countries. These macroprudential instruments 
are more related to reduce booms and thereby busts, in real estate markets and appear to be insignificant 
regulatory measures in curbing capital flows (Claessens 2014, Cerutti et al. 2015). And progress is also being 
made to reduce the systemic risks created by large financial institutions SIFIs using, among others, 
macroprudential policies. Altogether, the empirical results imply that macroprudential instruments have a 
considerable impact on procyclicality and volume of capital flows. Countries can limit the circumvention of 
these policies by following Basel III regulations and adopting certain capital controls across borders.  
      The findings of the research have important policy implications for global policymakers who are 
confronting global nature of risk which threatens financial stability. We now know what capital controls and 
macroprudential policies are effective in reducing the volume of cross-border banking flows. Additionally, we 
are first to provide empirical evidence that these instruments should be used together to manage countries’ 























A: Descriptive Statistics and Benchmark Regression Results 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
This table summarizes the key variables grouped into global factors, financial market factors and country-specific factors. We 
provide their names, number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. Additionally, Table provides 
summary of Capital Controls and Macroprudential policies. 
 
 Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Per cent Change in cross-
border Claims on banks  
(Xafter - Xbefore)/Xbefore) 
2,533 -0.7640348 0.688131 -1.592289 0.07 
VIX CBOE (logged VIXt) 2,533 21.10941 8.165958 11.04 44.68 
Per cent Change in 
Government Expenditure 
(calculated by an author 
with the help of formula) 
 
2,533 0.0097956 0.0405908 -0.0407889 0.0676812 
Change in Government debt 
(data provided) 
2,533 48.61016 25.45275 14.732 95.561 
Log GDP Deflator 
 
2,533 6.805786 0.8734698 5.02388 7.720462 
 
Log Government revenue 
 
2,533 3.304895 0.3563753 2.749448 3.813771 
Change in US Money 
Supply M2 (y/y – data 
provided) 
2,533 6.333529 1.512265 2.513 8.622 
 
Change in Inflation (data 
provided) 
 
2,533 4.84701 3.837008 0.325 12.184 
Stock markets turnover ratio 
(value traded/capitalization) 
2,533 32.86588 9.866256 12.81 53.98 
Per cent  Change in Current 
account (data provided) 
2,533 -2.059927 6.801619 -12.309 9.97 
Overall restrictions index  1,552 0.37 0.31 0 1 
Overall outflow restrictions 
index 
1,552 0.29 0.29 0 1 
Direct investment outflow 
restrictions 
1,552 0.17 0.32 0 1 
Equity outflow restrictions 
index 1,552 0.27 0.34 0 1 
Bond outflow restrictions 
index 1,552 0.32 0.35 0 1 
Derivatives outflow 








Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
This table provides summary of Capital Controls and Macroprudential policies. We provide their names, number of observations, 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. 
 




1,552 0.30 0.36 0 1 
Financial credits 
outflow restrictions  1,552 0.41 0.51 0 1 
Commercial credits 
outflow restrictions  1,552 0.31 0.41 0 1 
Collective 
investments outflow 
restrictions index  
1,552 0.33 0.46 0 1 
Overall inflow 




1,552 0.76 0.40 0 1 
Equity inflow 
restrictions index 1,552 0.38 0.39 0 1 
Bond inflow 
restrictions index 1,552 0.27 0.38 0 1 
Derivatives inflow 
restrictions 1,552 0.33 0.29 0 1 
Money Market inflow 
restrictions index 1,552 0.32 0.40 0 1 
Financial credits 
inflow restrictions 1,552 0.25 0.38 0 1 
Commercial credits 
























Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
This table provides summary of Capital Controls and Macroprudential policies. We provide their names, number of observations, 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  1,791 1.96 1.43 0 8 MPI (index 0-12) 
  
1,788 1.56 1.33 0 
  
FINANCIAL MPI (0-10) 7 
  
  
1,788 0.28 0.59 0 2 BORROWER MPI (0-2) 
 
  
1,788 0.02 0.9 0 1 CTC  
  
1,792 0.18 0.35 0 1 RR_REV 
  
  
1,792 0.11 0.31 0 1 RR 
  
  
1,792 0.7 0.5 0 1 CONC 
  
  
1,789 0.2 0.34 0 1 INTER 
 
  
1,792 0.1 0.29 0 1 FC 
  
  
1,921 0.11 0.3 0 1 SIFI 
  
  
1,788 0.15 0.35 0 1 LEV 
  
  
1,792 0.1 0.28 0 1 CG 
  
  





1,739 0.5223782 1.604578 -1.894798 2.389193 
 





Δ REER (US) (data calculated by 
an author with the help of 
formula) 
 








Table 2 List of Countries 
This table summarizes the list of countries included in panel regression analysis with country fixed effects. 
 
Albania Iceland Panama 
Algeria India Paraguay 
Angola Indonesia Peru 
Armenia Ireland Philippines 
Australia Israel Poland 
Austria Italy Portugal 
Azerbaijan Jamaica Qatar 
Bahamas Japan Romania 
Bangladesh Jordan Russia 
Belarus Kazakhstan Rwanda 
Belgium Kenya Saudi Arabia 
Bolivia Korea Serbia 
Brazil Kuwait Singapore 
Bulgaria Latvia Slovak Republic 
Burundi Lebanon Slovenia 
Canada Libya South Africa 
Chile Lithuania Spain 
China Luxembourg Sri Lanka 
Colombia Malawi Sweden 
Costa Rica Malaysia Switzerland 
Croatia Maldives Taiwan Province of China 
Cyprus Mali Tanzania 
Czech Republic Malta Thailand 
Denmark Mauritius Tunisia 
Dominican Republic Mexico Turkey 
Egypt Moldova Turkmenistan 
Estonia Mongolia Uganda 
Ethiopia Montenegro Ukraine 
Finland Morocco United Arab Emirates 
France Mozambique United Kingdom 
Georgia Namibia United States 
Germany Nepal Uzbekistan 
Ghana Netherlands Venezuela 
Greece New Zealand Vietnam 
Guatemala Nicaragua Zambia 
Haiti Norway Zimbabwe 
Hong Kong SAR Oman   









Table 3 Descriptive Analysis of Macroprudential Instruments 7 
 
Instrument/Group Sheet Name/ Abbrevation Definition 
Groups     
Macroprudential Index (0-12)                         MPI 
 
LTV_CAP + DTI + DP + CTC + 
LEV + SIFI + INTER + CONC + 
FC + RR_REV + CG + TAX 





LTV_CAP + DTI 
Financial Institution-Targted Instruments 
(0-10) 
FINANCIAL  DP + CTC + LEV + SIFI + INTER 
+ CONC + FC + RR_REV + CG + 
TAX 
  
Borrower-targeted macroprudential instruments 
 
Survey Instruments (0-1)     
Loan-to-Value Ratio LTV Constrains highly levered mortgage 
downpayments by enforcing or 
encouraging a limit or by 
determining regulatory risk 
weights. 
Debt-to-Income Ratio DTI Imposes restrictions on households 
indebtedness by enforcing or 
stimulating limits. 
Derived Instruments (0-1)     
Loan-to-Value Ratio Caps LTV_CAP Imposes restrictions to LTV used 
as a strictly enforced cap on new 
loans, in contrast with a 
supervisory instruction or merely a 
determinant of risk weights.  








                                               
7 Source: “The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence” by Eugenio Cerutti, Stijn Claessens and Luc 












                                               
8 Source: “The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence” by Eugenio Cerutti, Stijn Claessens and Luc 
Laeven. IMF Working paper, March 2015. 
Table 3 Descriptive Analysis of Macroprudential Instruments 8 
 
Instrument/Group Sheet Name/ Abbrevation Definition 
Financial institution-targeted macroprudential instruments 
 
Survey Instruments (0-1)   
Leverage Ratio LEV  
Imposes limits on banks from going 
over a fixed minimum leverage ratio. 
Capital Surcharges on SIFIs SIFI  Imposes a requirement on systemically 
important financial institutions to have a 
higher capital level than other financial 
institutions. 
Limits on Interbank Exposures INTER Imposes limits on the proportion of 
liabilities held by the banking sector or 
by individual banks. 
Concentration Limits CONC Imposes limits on the proportion of 
assets held by a small or limited number 
of borrowers. 
Limits on Foreign Currency Loans FC  Limits aimed to reduce or mitigate 
exposures to foreign-currency risks. 
Reserve Requirement Ratios RR Imposes limits on credit growth and can 
be employed to reduce foreign-currency 
credit growth. 
       Limits on Domestic Currency Loans CG Imposes limits on credit growth directly. 
Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions TAX Imposes taxes on proceeds of financial 
institutions. 
Time-Varying/Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning DP  Imposes a requirement on banks to have 
more loan-loss provisions during 
recovery stage or upturns. 
General Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer/Requirement  
CTC Imposes a requirement on banks to have 
more capital during recovery stage or 
upturns. 
Derived Instruments (0-1) 
 
  
FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve Requirements RR_REV Imposes restriction to reserve 
requirements RR by a) having a wedge 
of on foreign currency deposits, or b) is 
meant to be adjusted countercyclically. 
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Table 4 The usage of macroprudential instruments in a sample of 112 countries, over the 
period 2000-2016 
For each subgroup of countries, the frequency of use is the ratio of country-years using a given instrument to the 












(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
LTV_CAP 25% 41% 20% 7% 
 
DTI 20% 14% 21% 1% 
 
DP 10% 6% 7% 19% 
 
CTC 14% 5% 12% 7% 
 
LEV 17% 14% 17% 12% 
 
SIFI 11% 5% 7% 10% 
 
INTER 32% 35% 33% 20% 
 
CONC 80% 72% 79% 80% 
 
FC 20% 12% 20% 16% 
 
RR_REV 26% 1% 27% 36% 
 
























                                               
9 Source: “The Use and Effectiveness of Macroprudential Policies: New Evidence” by Eugenio Cerutti, Stijn Claessens and Luc 
Laeven. IMF Working paper, March 2015. Corresponds to the calculations of Cerutti et al. 2015 and is extended by authors 
calculations. Source: European Central Bank Warehouse and IMF database. 
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Benchmark Regression results 
Table 5 Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims on 
Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore. MPI Macroprudential Index (0-12) represents a sum of individual Indices [ LTV_CAP + DTI + DP + CTC + 
LEV + SIFI + INTER + CONC + FC + RR_REV + CG + TAX]. FINANCIAL Financial Institution-Targeted Instruments (0-10) 
represents a sum of individual instruments [DP + CTC + LEV + SIFI + INTER + CONC + FC + RR_REV + CG + TAX]. 
BORROWER Borrower-Targeted Instruments (0-2) represents a sum of individual instruments [LTV_CAP + DTI]. Robust standard 




Macroprudential Index MPI 
 
Financial Institution-Targeted and 
Borrower-Targeted Instruments 





0.0020***  0.0014**  0.0013*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0002) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0151***  -0.0132***  -0.0149***  -0.0107*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0008) 
Δ Govexp -0.4069  -0.1569 -0.4329  -0.4377** 
 (0.4261) (0.5260) (0.4265) (0.1978) 
Δ GovDEBT  -0.0022*  -0.0033***  -0.0021*  -0.0012** 
 (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0006) 
Ln GDPdeflator  -0.0404**  -0.0210*  -0.0389**  -0.0250*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0123) (0.0195) (0.0070) 
Ln Govrevenue 0.0556  0.0936  
 (0.1515)  (0.1519)  
Δ M2 (US)  0.0123***  0.0102*** 0.0123*** 0.0095*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0041) (0.0012) 
Δ Inflation  -0.0118*  -0.0285***  -0.0124* -0.0076 
 (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0058) 
L1. CURRENT ACCOUNT -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0019 0.0002 
 (0.0046) (0.0018) (0.0046) (0.0010) 
L1. GOVERN. REVENUE  -0.0019   -0.0024 
  (0.0023)  (0.0027) 
ΔBankClaims L1. lag (2 2)  0.1113***  0.1262*** 
  (0.0419)  (0.0094) 
MPI L1. lag (2 2)   -0.0561***   
  (0.0130)   
FINANCIAL MPI  L1. lag (2 2)     -0.0318***     (0.0070) 
 MPI  -0.0838***    
 (0.0229)    
FINANCIAL MPI    -0.1397***     (0.0310)  
BORROWER MPI   0.0331  -0.0184 
      (0.0496) (0.0133) 
Constant -0.2208 0.0063 -0.3101  -0.2009 
 (0.5532) (0.1555) (0.5535) (0.1425) 
Country Fixed Effect Y 
 
Y  
AR(1) Test   0.000  0.000 
AR(2) Test    0.911   0.922 
Hansen Test/Sargan  1.000  1.000 
Observations 1,791 1,792 1,788 1,789 
R-squared 0.0159  0.0125    
































0.0012*** 0.0016**  0.0015**  0.0014***  0.0017** 
 (0.00068) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.00068) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0137***  -0.0102***  -0.0141***  -0.0140***  -0.0108***  -0.0140*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0029) 
Δ Govexp  -0.3332  -0.3281*  -0.4318  -0.4247  -0.3562**  -0.4403 
 (0.4256) (0.1748) (0.4247) (0.4250) (0.1599) (0.4249) 
Δ GovDEBT  -0.0018 -0.0003  -0.0019  -0.0022* -0.0001  -0.0019 
 (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) 
Ln GDPdeflator -0.0253 -0.0118 -0.0239 -0.0252 0.0030 -0.0230 
 (0.0188) (0.0077) (0.0188) (0.0188) (0.0055) (0.0188) 
Ln Govrevenue  0.0001  0.0586 0.0239  0.0168 
 (0.1512)  (0.1519) (0.1513)  (0.1512) 
Δ M2 (US)  0.0121***  0.0083*** 0.0124*** 0.0123*** 0.0091*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0013) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0011) (0.0041) 
Δ Inflation -0.0082 -0.0025 -0.0105  -0.0109* -0.0016  -0.0115* 
 (0.0069) (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0036) (0.0068) 
L1. CURRENT 
ACCOUNT 
 -0.0016 0.0010  -0.0014  -0.0014 0.0005  -0.0014 
 (0.0045) (0.0011) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0012) (0.0045) 
L1. GOVERN. REVENUE  0.0015   0.0001  
  (0.0020)   (0.0023)  
ΔBankClaims L1. (2 2)  0.1192***   0.1210***  
  (0.0080)   (0.0074)  
CTC  L1. lag (2 2)   -0.1114*       (0.0594)     
RR L1. lag (2 2)  
    -0.0436**       (0.0172)  
CTC  -0.4537***      
 (0.1669)      
RR_REV    -0.4865***       (0.1543)    
RR     -0.3376***       (0.1188)   
CONC       -0.3257*** 
            (0.1111) 
Constant -0.3620 -0.5624*** -0.4759  -0.3088  -0.5955*** -0.2282 
 (0.5525) (0.1047) (0.5513) (0.5536) (0.1060) (0.5563) 
Country Fixed Effect Y 
 
Y Y  Y 
AR(1) Test   0.000   0.000  
AR(2) Test   0.976   0.999  
Hansen Test/Sargan  1.000   1.000  
Observations 1,788 1,790 1,792 1,792 1,792 1,792 
R-squared 0.0197   0.0101   0.0120   0.0133 
Number of countries 112 112 112 112 112 112 
Table 6 Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims 
on Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula 
(Xafter - Xbefore)/Xbefore.  CTC General Countercyclical Capital Buffer/Requirement - requires banks to hold more capital 
during upturns. RR Reserve Requirement Ratios - limits credit growth; can also be targeted to limit foreign-currency credit 
growth. RR_REV FX and/or Countercyclical Reserve Requirements - restricts to RR which i) imposes a wedge of on foreign 
currency deposits, or ii) is adjusted countercyclically. CONC Concentration Limits - limits the fraction of assets held by a limited 
number of borrowers.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and indicate significance at the 1% *** p<0.01, at the 







Table 7 Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims on 
Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore. INTER Limits on Interbank Exposures - limits the fraction of liabilities held by the banking sector or by individual 
banks. FC Limits on Foreign Currency Loans - reduces vulnerability to foreign-currency risks. SIFI Capital Surcharges on SIFIs - 
requires Systemically Important Financial Institutions to hold a higher capital level than other financial institutions. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses and indicate significance at the 1%*** p<0.01, at the 5% ** p<0.05, and at the 10% * p<0.1, 
respectively. 
Variables 
Limits on Interbank 
Exposures 
Limits on Foreign Currency 
Loans 


















0.0014***  0.0016**  0.0012***  0.0017***  0.0019*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0143***  -0.0101***  -0.0141***  -0.0100***  -0.0141***  -0.0132*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0029) (0.0027) 
Δ Govexp  -0.3975 -0.3864  -0.4157 -0.4704  -0.4067 -0.3615 
 (0.4254) (0.2392) (0.4252) (0.2914) (0.4112) (0.4009) 
Δ GovDEBT  -0.0016 -0.0003  -0.0015 -0.0005  -0.0016  -0.0005 
 (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0007) 
Ln GDPdeflator -0.0278  -0.0115* -0.0284  -0.0143*  -0.0314*  -0.0298* 
 (0.0190) (0.0062) (0.0190) (0.0078) (0.0182) (0.0175) 
Ln Govrevenue  0.0032  0.0307 
 0.0153 0.0617 
 (0.1518)  (0.1516)  (0.1493) (0.0524) 
Δ M2 (US)  0.0127***  0.0081*** 0.0126*** 0.0080*** 0.0109*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0010) (0.0041) (0.0012) (0.0040) (0.0039) 
Δ Inflation -0.0105 -0.0008  -0.0114* -0.0009 -0.0096  -0.0148* 
 (0.0068) (0.0056) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0077) 
L1. CURRENT ACCOUNT  -0.0018 0.0002  -0.0015 0.0006  -0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.0045) (0.0010) (0.0045) (0.0011) (0.0044) (0.0027) 
L1. GOVERN. REVENUE  0.0046*  0.0037   
  (0.0024)  (0.0025)   
ΔBankClaims L1. lag (2 2)  0.1262***  0.1245***   
  (0.0092)  (0.0085)   
 INTER  L1. lag (2 2) 
 




  (0.0166)     
FC L1. lag (2 2)  
   -0.0709***       (0.0156)   
 INTER  -0.2316**      
 (0.1034)      
FC     -0.2383**       (0.1026)    
SIFI      -0.2169**  -0.1665**      (0.0907) (0.0841) 
Constant -0.3059 -0.6688*** -0.4216  -0.6265*** -0.3827  -0.5949*** 
 (0.5567) (0.1111) (0.5520) (0.1042) (0.5407) (0.2242) 
Country Fixed Effect Y  Y 
 Y  
AR(1) Test   0.000  0.000   
AR(2) Test   0.998  0.992   
Hansen Test/Sargan 
 1.000  1.000   
Observations 1,789 1,790 1,792 1,792 1,920 1,920 
R-squared  0.0125   0.0113   0.0181     
Number of countries 112 112 112 112 120 120 
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Table 8 Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims on 
Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore. LEV Leverage Ratio - limits banks from exceeding a fixed minimum leverage ratio. CG Limits on Domestic 
Currency Loans - limits credit growth directly. TAX Levy/Tax on Financial Institutions - taxes revenues of financial institutions. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and indicate significance at the 1%*** p<0.01, at the 5% ** p<0.05, and at the 














0.0011*  0.0011* 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0139***  -0.0110***  -0.0113*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Δ Govexp  -0.3609 -0.3489 -0.3793 
 (0.4265) (0.4255) (0.4266) 
Δ GovDEBT  -0.0015 -0.0019  -0.0021* 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln GDPdeflator  -0.0206*  -0.0520***  -0.0520*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0199) (0.0199) 
Ln Govrevenue  0.0011 0.1852 0.1904 
 (0.1529) (0.1558) (0.1556) 
Δ M2 (US)  0.0125***  0.0089** 0.0088** 
 (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Δ Inflation  -0.0097*  -0.0036***  -0.0038*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
L1. CURRENT ACCOUNT  -0.0013 -0.003 -0.0018 
 (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0046) 
LEV  0.0394   












Constant -0.4231 -0.0701 -0.0272 
 (0.5547) (0.5593) (0.5642) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
Observations 1,788 1,792 1,792 
R-squared 0.0143 0.0196 0.0229 





Table 9 Panel Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims on 
Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore. FINANCIAL Financial Institution-Targeted Instruments (0-10) represents a sum of individual instruments [DP 
+ CTC + LEV + SIFI + INTER + CONC + FC + RR_REV + CG + TAX]. Chinn-Ito Index - is an Index measuring a country's 
degree of capital account openness over 2000-2014. US, UK Financial freedom Index - financial freedom is a measure of banking 
security as well as a measure of independence from government control. Δ REER (US) – per cent change in Real Effective Exchange 
Rates. ROE (US) - Return On Equity. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and indicate significance at the 1% *** 
p<0.01, at the 5% ** p<0.05, and at the 10% * p<0.1, respectively.  
 





0.0016*  0.0001  0.0011*  0.0029*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0144***  -0.0156***  -0.0167***  -0.0146***  -0.0104*** 
  (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) 
Δ Govexp  -0.3937  -0.3850  -0.4889  -0.4027  -0.3305 
 (0.4338) (0.4226) (0.4252) (0.4258) (0.4226) 
Δ GovDEBT  -0.0021*  -0.0021*  -0.0024*  -0.0023*  -0.0026** 
 (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) 
Ln GDPdeflator  -0.0430**  -0.0624***  -0.0606***  -0.0438**  -0.0616*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0200) 
Ln Govrevenue  0.0818  0.2009 0.1687 0.1194 0.2084 
 (0.1571) (0.1547) (0.1532) (0.1526) (0.1547) 
Δ M2 (US)  0.0119***  0.0129*** 0.0114*** 0.0111*** 0.0141*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Δ Inflation  -0.0135*  -0.0142**  -0.0150**  -0.0138**  -0.0121* 
 (0.0070) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0068) 
L1. CURRENT ACCOUNT  -0.0035 -0.0041  -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0039 
 (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
FINANCIAL MPI  -0.1200***  -0.0845***  -0.0932***  -0.1252***  -0.0940*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0326) (0.0323) (0.0303) (0.0314) 
Chinn-Ito Index  0.0247    -0.0184  -0.0184 
 (0.0332)   (0.0133) (0.0133) 
US Financial Openness Index   0.0080*** 
   
  (0.0023)    
UK Financial Openness Index    0.0152***   
  
 (0.0045)   
Δ REER (UK)     -0.0066* 
 
  
  (0.0037)  
ROE (US)      0.0214*** 
      (0.0058) 
Constant -0.2869 -1.1805* -1.6416**  -0.2768  -0.9797* 
 (0.5704) (0.6044) (0.6871) (0.5501) (0.5793) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,739 1,788 1,788 1,788 1,788 
R-squared 0.0119 0.0223 0.0209 0.0148 0.0214 





Table 10 Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims on 
Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore. SCHINDLER (2009) and IMF database on capital controls and Macroprudential Indices: Equity outflow 
restrictions index, Bond inflow restrictions index, Collective investments outflow restrictions, CTC and CONC. Robust standard 











Collective invest. outflow 
index and CTC 
Panel Regression Panel Regression Panel Regression 
Stockturnover 
   
 0.0022***  0.0023***  0.0023*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0157***  -0.0158***  -0.0162*** 
 (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Δ Govexp -0.4270 -0.3941 -0.3692 
 (0.5374) (0.5375) (0.5374) 
Δ GovDEBT -0.0012 -0.0018 -0.0015 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Ln GDPdeflator -0.0063 -0.0017 -0.0064 
 (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0227) 
Ln Govrevenue 0.1223 0.1054 0.0724 
 (0.1785) (0.1784) (0.1770) 
Δ M2 (US)  0.0127**  0.0126** 0.0128*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) 
Δ Inflation  -0.0169*  -0.0159*  -0.0152* 
 (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
L1. CURRENT ACCOUNT -0.0046 -0.0049 -0.0047 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 





 (0.0843)   
CTC  -0.4760**  -0.5311**  -0.4967** 
 (0.2059) (0.2047) (0.2054) 
Bond inflow restrictions index    -0.1733*    (0.1016)  
Collective investments outflow 
restrictions    -0.0952* 
 
  (0.0510) 
Constant -0.5925 -0.5773 -0.5172 
 (0.6470) (0.6500) (0.6534) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
Observations 1,244 1,244 1,244 
R-squared 0.0285 0.0260 0.0265 






Table 11 Regression Results for Cross-Border Claims to Banks, for period 2000-2016 
Dependent Variable: Per cent Change in cross-border claims on banks (Per cent Change in BIS Locational Cross-Border Claims on 
Banks, exchange rate adjusted, Table A6). Per cent Change (%ΔX) in Claims on banks is calculated by using the formula (Xafter - 
Xbefore)/Xbefore. SCHINDLER (2009) and IMF database on capital controls and Macroprudential Indices: Equity outflow 
restrictions index, Bond inflow restrictions index, Collective investments outflow restrictions, CTC and CONC. Robust standard 










outflow index and 
CONC 








 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
VIX CBOE  -0.0158***  -0.0159***  -0.0163*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) 
Δ Govexp -0.5326 -0.4995 -0.4734 
 (0.5364) (0.5368) (0.5367) 
Δ GovDEBT -0.0014 -0.0020 -0.0017 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Ln GDPdeflator -0.0076 -0.0025 -0.0074 
 (0.0227) (0.0226) (0.0227) 
Ln Govrevenue 0.1254 0.1045 0.0708 
 (0.1787) (0.1786) (0.1773) 
Δ M2 (US)  0.0128***  0.0127**  0.0129*** 
 (0.0049) (0.00493) (0.0049) 
Δ Inflation  -0.0196**  -0.0187**  -0.0178** 
 (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0089) 
L1. CURRENT ACCOUNT -0.0040 -0.0043 -0.0041 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Equity outflow restrictions index   -0.2068**   
 (0.0837)   





 (0.1018)  





  (0.0508) 
CONC  -0.2876*  -0.3009*  -0.2814* 
 (0.1564) (0.1568) (0.1566) 
Constant -0.3851 -0.3683 -0.3254 
 (0.6614) (0.6653) (0.6675) 
Country Fixed Effect Y Y Y 
Observations 1,248 1,248 1,248 
R-squared 0.0185 0.0166 0.0164 
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